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The decision of the Constitutional Court (the Court) in the case of Government of the
Republic of South Africa versus Grootboom1 was received as ground breaking by
human rights practitioners, scholars and advocates the world over. If it were possible
to assess the case in terms of new music releases, one would say that the
‘Grootboom album’ became an instant hit on the top of all music charts. The case
instantly established itself as a landmark, signifying the undeniable justiciability of
economic and social rights (socio-economic rights). Thus, the case became a
promise that the lives of South Africans living in crisis-like situations would be
changed for the better.2 The Court’s reasonable programme review approach
instantly became the litmus test with which to determine whether government has
discharged its obligations to realise the various constitutionally protected economic,
socio-economic rights. Since then, the approach has dominated both academic and
judicial ‘dance halls’ as the tune to dance to when making deliberations on the
realisation of such socio-economic rights as health care,3 water,4 food,5 and housing.6
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However, alongside the praises, the Grootboom judgment was also subjected
to a number of negative critiques, directed especially to the Court’s rejection of the
minimum core obligations approach,7 in addition to critiques on the Court’s
approach to the issue of remedies. The biggest criticism that has been levied at
the case and other socio-economic rights cases that immediately followed it is the
failure of the courts to guarantee remedies that assure poor litigants individualised
goods and services. Indeed, the death of Mrs Irene Grootboom in a shack
attracted highly publicised criticism to the effect that the Constitution meant very
little to the poor.8 In his web blog, Pierre de Vos described Mrs Irene Grootboom
as a true revolutionary who had put her trust in the law, the courts and politicians
to help her to get access to a house. De Vos concludes, however, that true
revolutionaries often die young, penniless and homeless.9
Commenting on the remedial approach of the Court, one scholar has stated
that despite the cogent statements of the Court concerning the justiciability of the
rights, effective remedies for their enforcement remain jurisprudentially elusive
and problematic.10 Early critics focused on the structural interdict, condemning the
Court for its reluctance to use this form of relief.11 With recent decisions showing
use of the remedy, are these criticisms still valid? What explains the Court’s
change of approach toward willingness to order a structural interdict? 
Being a ten year retrospect of the Grootboom case, this paper undertakes a
chronological exploration and critique of the courts’ approach to the subject of
remedies. An assessment reveals that the approach of the courts, and particularly
the Constitutional Court, has been a mixture of successes and failures. South
Africa stands out as an example of the challenges of finding appropriate relief for
proclaimed socio-economic rights violations. This is against a background of a
perceived constitutional imperative to uphold the doctrine of separation of powers.
At the same time, the approach of the courts is a reminder of how pragmatic and
dynamic courts need to be when dealing with constitutional remedies. The
Constitutional Court’s refusal to grant a structural interdict in both the Grootboom
7See Bilchitz ‘Giving socio-economic rights teeth: The minimum core and its importance’ (2002) 118
SALJ 484; ‘The right to health care services and the minimum core: Disentangling the principled and
pragmatic strands’ (2006) ESR Review 2; ‘Towards a reasonable approach to the minimum core:
Laying the foundations for future socio-economic rights jurisprudence’ (2003) 19 SALJ 1.
8See Mail & Guardian ‘Grootboom dies homelesss and penniless’ 2008-08-08.
9‘Irene Grootboom died, homeless, forgotten, no C-class Mercedes in sight’ available at http://
constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/irene-grootboom-died-homeless-forgotten-no-c-class-mercedes-in-sight/
(accessed 2010-12-08).
10Choma ‘Constitutional enforcement of socio-economic rights: South African case study’ (2009) 6
US-China LR 46. 
11See Heywood ‘Preventing mother-to-child HIV transmission in South Africa: Background strategies
and outcomes of the Treatment Action Campaign case against the Minister of Health’ (2003) 19
SAJHR 278; and Swart ‘Left out in the cold? Crafting constitutional remedies for the poorest of the
poor’ (2005) 21 SAJHR 215. 
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and TAC case will be contrasted with its willingness to grant the same remedy in
Olivia and subsequent cases. This is evidence of the fact that socio-economic
(and broadly constitutional) litigation is a dynamic exercise requiring judges to be
open-minded and conscious of the context within which different cases arise.
This paper is divided into three parts; part one discusses the nature of the
remedial mandate of the courts as defined by sections 7, 38 and 172(1) of the
Constitution. In discussing these provisions, reference is made to Klaaren’s
classification of the provisions either as ‘primary remedy clauses’ or as ‘secondary
remedy clauses’.12 Some of the factors that have impacted on the approach of the
courts in defining what is meant by ‘appropriate, just and equitable relief’ are
briefly explored. Part two explores the approach taken in the jurisprudence of the
courts in defining remedies for socio-economic rights violations. This section takes
a largely chronological discussion of some of the major cases, showing that, at
first, the Court adopted a largely deferential approach. This was so even in those
cases where the Court deemed it necessary to grant a mandatory interdict. This
period of judicial deference and reluctance to use the structural interdict is
described as the ‘pre-Olivia period’, that is, before the approach of the Court in the
case of Occupiers of 15 Olivia Road v City of Johannesburg (Olivia case).13  
Part three discuss the Olivia and post-Olivia approach, characterised by
willingness to use the structural interdict and a new approach called ‘meaningful
engagement. In the Olivia case, the Court ordered the respondents to engage the
applicants for the purposes of finding a solution to the dispute that gave rise to the
petition. The Olivia approach has since entrenched itself and has been used
repeatedly, not only as a remedial measure but as a test for determining the
constitutionality of the state’s conduct, particularly in evictions cases. Thus, as
seen in the case of Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v
Thubelisha Homes (Joe Slovo case),14 meaningful engagement has become a
formidable tool for the poor even in those cases where the application is lost, yet
engagement makes it possible to win the battle. It is argued that the Olivia
approach of meaningful engagement comes as a response to the deficit of
democracy created by local governments failing to involve and consult
communities on decisions that have implications for access to socio-economic
goods and services.  The Olivia approach, as seen in the Joe Slovo case, is also
important to the extent that it heralds a willingness by the Court to order the
provision of concrete goods and services. This has been done in a manner
reminiscent of the minimum core obligations approach.  
12Klaaren ‘Judicial remedies’ in Chaskalson et al Constitutional law in South Africa (1999) 9-i. 
132008 5 BCLR 475.
142009 9 BCLR 847.
Grootboom: A paradigm of individual remedies versus reasonable programmes 63
2 The Court’s constitutional remedial mandate 
It is important to begin any discussion of constitutional remedies with an
understanding of the constitutional provisions that define the mandate of the
courts to grant relief for the violation of constitutional obligations. In this regard,
to identify the relevant provisions of the South African Constitution, one could
borrow Klaaren’s classification defining the provisions as either ‘primary remedy
clauses’ or as ‘secondary remedy clauses’.15 According to Klaaren, the secondary
clauses serve both to reserve part of the remedial powers granted by the primary
clauses to the courts and to grant the courts the discretion to implement that relief.
Based on this categorisation, Klaaren identifies sections 2, 7(2) and 38 of the
Constitution as the primary clauses. Section 2 proclaims the Constitution as the
primary law and invalidates any law or conduct that is inconsistent with it. On its
part, section 7(2), which Klaaren refers to as ‘a significant innovation in
recognising the importance of non-judicial remedies’16 requires the state to
respect, protect, promote and fulfill the rights in the Bill of Rights. Section 38
defines the categories of persons with standing to enforce the rights in the Bill of
Rights and empowers the courts upon being approached to grant appropriate
relief including a declaration of rights.  
Klaaren’s secondary remedy clause is section 172(1), which requires courts
when deciding constitutional matters to declare any law or conduct that is
inconsistent with the Constitution invalid to the extent of their inconsistency. This
is in addition to making any order that is just and equitable, including: (i) an order
limiting the retrospective effect of the declaration of invalidity; and (ii) an order
suspending the declaration of invalidity for any period and on any conditions to
allow the competent authority to correct the defect. 
An aggregation of the primary and secondary clauses places a constitutional
imperative on the courts to grant ‘appropriate, just and equitable’ relief. The
question which then follows is: what amounts to appropriate, just and equitable
relief? It is fourteen years since the Constitutional Court’s decision in Fose v
Minister of Safety and Security17 and this decision continues to give substance to
what appropriate, just and equitable relief means. The Court held that appropriate
relief will in essence be relief required to protect and enforce the Constitution.
According to the Court, depending on the circumstances of each particular case,
the relief may be a declaration of rights, an interdict, a mandamus or such other
relief as may be required to ensure that the rights enshrined in the Constitution
are protected. The Court adds that, if it is necessary to do so, the courts may even
have to fashion new remedies to secure the protection and enforcement of these
15Klaaren (n 12) 9-1.
16Id 9-2. 
17Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 7 BCLR 851 (CC).
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all- important rights.18 This holding is important to the extent that it enumerates the
nature of the constitutional mandate of the courts to enforce the provisions of the
Constitution. The holding, as concise as it may be, is enough to make the point
that the courts have a ‘blank cheque’ when it comes to fashioning remedies, and
to such an extent that ‘they may even fashion new remedies’. 
What is lacking in the jurisprudence of the courts though is an elaborate and
explicit discussion of the approach to the issue of remedies.19 With respect to the
structural interdict, the Constitutional Court has been ambivalent in determining
the circumstances under which this form of relief would be considered
appropriate. This is despite the fact that the Court has granted the relief in some
cases. The Court has not laid down any principles and norms to guide the
application of this form of relief.20 As far back as 1999, one commentator observed
that ‘[r]ather than setting out a precise method and clearly distinguishing between
various approaches, courts … have been and are likely to continue to engage in
a case-by-case inquiry in appropriate relief in the circumstances’.21 In my opinion,
however, this does not absolve the courts from adopting principled positions that
can still be flexibly applied on a case-by-case basis.   
Nonetheless, an analysis of the jurisprudence of the courts discloses some
factors that have implicitly influenced their various approaches adopted thus far.
Elsewhere, I have analysed and given meaning to the phrase ‘appropriate, just and
equitable relief’, arguing that among others, a court’s definition of what amounts to
an appropriate, just and equitable remedy depends on the form of justice toward
which a court is inclined.22 The conclusion is based on a thesis which classifies
justice either as based on an ethos of corrective justice or on an ethos of distributive
justice. The notion of corrective justice, as supported by the philosophy of
libertarianism, glorifies the autonomy of an individual entitled to protection even when
this is at the expense of the welfare of society as a whole.23 Litigation based on this
philosophy is aimed at restoring the individual to the position he or she was in before
a wrong was committed against him or her. In contrast, the notion of distributive
justice, supported by the philosophy of utilitarianism, disputes a position that an
individual is an end in him/herself. In this context, litigation must be pursued and
concluded with the interest of society as a whole in mind.      
It is on the basis of the notion of distributive justice that the courts have given
meaning to their constitutional imperative to grant appropriate, just and equitable
18Fose para 19.
19Klaaren (n 12 above) 9-16A
20Mbazira ‘From ambivalence to certainty: Norms and principles for the structural interdict in socio-
economic rights litigation in South Africa’ (2008) 24 SAJHR 2.
21As above.
22Mbazira ‘“Appropriate, just and equitable relief” in socio-economic rights litigation: The tension
between corrective and distributive forms of justice’ (2008) 12 SALJ 71 at 89.
23As above 72.
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relief. In S v Bhulwana,24 the Constitutional Court held that litigants before the court
should not be singled out for the grant of relief, but relief should, taking into account
the obvious limitations of litigation, as far as possible, be afforded to all people who
are in the same position as the litigants.25 It is therefore not by accident that until
recently, remedies in socio-economic rights litigation have not immediately resulted
in goods and services for individual litigants. In those cases where litigants have
obtained individual goods and services, generally, this has not directly resulted from
court interdicts but rather from settlements between the parties. 
It is against the above contextual background that the remedies which the
courts, and particularly the Constitutional Court, have thus far awarded in socio-
economic rights litigation should be analysed. In my opinion, although it may be
a bit early to classify the jurisprudence of the Court in terms of approaches to
remedies, it is true that the Olivia case heralds a new era as evidenced by the
readiness to give structural orders. This is in addition to the new approach of
ordering meaningful engagement between litigants and respondent authorities.
For this reason, I use the classification of ‘pre-Olivia’ and ‘post-Olivia’ to analyse
the approach to remedies thus far. 
The pre-Olivia era was characterised by a cautious approach, guided by the
need to adhere to the doctrine of separation of powers. In contrast, although still
cautious, the post-Olivia era has witnessed structural interdicts made to secure
compliance in some cases. This has been coupled with negotiated settlements
resulting in immediate relief in terms of substantive goods and services to
desperate litigants. However, as indicated above, in spite of this, the Court has
not adopted a principled approach to the grant of structural interdicts.
3 The pre-Olivia era   
The pre-Olivia era started on 27 November 1997 when the Court handed down
judgment in the case of Soobramoney v Minister of Health, (KwaZulu-Natal).26 The
Soobramoney case was followed by judgment in the Grootboom case which set the
stage for a number of other judgments related to socio-economic rights, including,
among others, Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (TAC case),27
Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd v President of RSA, 28 and Khosa v Minister of Social
241996 1 SA 388 (CC).
25Paragraph 32. I have argued that it is on the basis of this that the Court in Dikoko v Mokhatla, 2006
6 SA 235 (CC), set aside an excessive award of damages in a defamation case on the ground that the
award of excessive damages would have implications for freedom of expression which is the lifeblood
of a democratic society (paras 54 and 92). In Rail Commuters Action Group v Transnet t/a Metrorail
2005 2 SA 359 (CC), the Court rejected punitive damages as merely bringing a windfall to a single
individual while similarly situated victims would not be entitled to a similar award (para 71).  
261998 1 SA 765 (CC).
27See (n 3).
282005 8 BCLR 786 (CC).
(2011) 26 SAPL66
Development.29 An analysis of these judgments reveals that the Court was
struggling to find its feet as an organ of the state in the new constitutional
dispensation vis-a-vis the other organs of state. The Court quickly realised that it
has the unenviable task of maintaining a ‘delicate balance’ between its powers and
those of the other organs of state.30  In this process, the Court opted for judicial
deference and restraint not only in defining the substance of constitutional rights,
but in determining the remedies that should follow their infringement. 
Hence, in Soobramoney, the Constitutional Court reached the conclusion that
‘[a] court will be slow to interfere with rational decisions taken in good faith by the
political organs and medical authorities whose responsibility it is to deal with such
matters’.31 In remedial terms, the Court chose what have been described as ‘weak
remedies’.32 Remedies would not be ‘personal and present’.33 Tushnet has described
weak remedies as including declarations and orders that require the state to craft
programmes that hold out some promise of eliminating the violation, and once this
is done the court steps back.34 Another example given is the encouragement of
negotiations among affected parties over the contours of a detailed plan.35
The following elaboration will, however, show that the Court did not exercise
the full breadth of weak remedies described by Tushnet. In the TAC case the
Court handed down a mandatory interdict, which when tested against Tushnet’s
characterisation does not qualify as ‘a strong remedy’. 
The Court’s commitment to weak remedies is evidenced by its approach in
the Grootboom case. This case started in the High Court with the decision of
Judge Dennis Davis in Grootboom v Oostenberg Municipality.36 The order made
by Judge Davis, although crafted as a proposal for a declaratory order, was
powerful enough to have the command of a mandatory interdict. Basing the order
on section 28 of the Constitution, the Court declared that ‘the applicant children
are entitled to be provided with shelter by the appropriate organ or department’
and that ‘the applicant parents are entitled to be accommodated with their children
in the afore-going shelter’. What made this declaration so powerful, and what
transformed it into a mandatory interdict, was the retention of jurisdiction and the
court’s direction that respondents, within a period of three months, must present
a report under oath as to the implementation of the order. 
292004 6 SA 505 (CC); 2004 6 BCLR 569 (CC).
30See Klaaren (ed) A delicate balance: The place of the judiciary in constitutional democracy (2006);
Lenta ‘Judicial restraint and overreach’ (2004) 20 South African Journal on Human Rights 544; Davis
‘Adjudicating the socio-economic rights in the South African Constitution: Towards “deference lite”?’
(2006) 22 South African Journal on Human Rights 301.
31Paragraph 29 (my emphasis). 
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Grootboom: A paradigm of individual remedies versus reasonable programmes 67
For one to appreciate the power of Judge Davis’s order, it is important to
understand the nature of a declaratory order and the principles which govern its
applications. One could describe a declaratory order as a non-intrusive remedy
used by the courts to pronounce on legal rights and their infringement.37 In effect,
this enables a court to declare the law while leaving it to the other organs to
decide how the law as declared should be observed.38 In my opinion, however,
once accompanied by an order to report back to the court, although the
respondent seemingly still has discretion, this discretion is greatly depreciated.
This is because at the report back session the court if not satisfied with the
approach of the respondent could order an alternative approach, which could then
become an interdict.   
In setting aside the decision of the High Court as regards section 28, the
Constitutional Court did not comment on the structural order made by the High
Court. Basing its decision on the finding that the state had violated section 26 by
not having a reasonable programme in place, the Court declared that section
26(2) required the state to devise and implement within its available resources a
comprehensive and coordinated programme to realise the right of access to
adequate housing. The Court then enumerated the contents of such a
programme.39 In conclusion, the Court ended its order with a declaration that the
housing programme in the Cape Metropolitan Council fell short of the
requirements of a reasonable programme inasmuch as it did not make reasonable
provision within its available resources for people with no access to land, no roof
over their heads and who were living in intolerable conditions or crisis situations.40
In the TAC case the Court order started with a declaration that the
government policy of reducing mother-to-child transmission of HIV fell short of the
requirements of a reasonable programme. The declaration was followed by a
mandatory order requiring the state, without delay, to do a number of things that
would remove restrictions on access to nevirapine. This included facilitating the
use of nevirapine, training counsellors on its use and extending counselling and
testing facilities to all public hospitals.41 The order was, however, in a manner
reflecting judicial deference immediately followed by this statement:
The orders made in paragraph 3 do not preclude government from adapting its
policy in a manner consistent with the Constitution if equally appropriate or better
methods become available to it for the prevention of mother-to-child transmission
of HIV.42
37Mbazira Litigating socio-economic rights in South Africa: A choice between corrective and
distributive justice (2009) 156.






It is the above deference and the failure to make a supervisory order which,
when one follows Tushnet’s characterisation, disqualifies the TAC order as a strong
remedy. Tushnet defines strong remedies as mandatory injunctions that spell out
in detail what government officials are to do by identifying goals, the achievement
of which can be measured easily, for instance, through numerical measurements.43
Tushnet adds that such injunctions also set specific deadlines for the
accomplishment of the set goals and the court and state officials interact closely.44
As is clear from the TAC judgment, a request for a supervisory order was
dismissed by the Court on the ground that ‘the government has always respected
and executed orders of this Court’ and that there was no ‘reason to believe that
it will not do so’.45 This conclusion was motivated by the evidence that emerged
during the hearing that the government had made substantial funds available for
the treatment of HIV, including the reduction of mother-to-child transmission.46 In
my opinion, this evidence blinded the Court to the high level of recalcitrance
demonstrated by the government during the hearing, which included a declaration
by the Minister of Health that government would not respect the judgment of the
Court.47 This alone would have justified making a supervisory order. The Court
has also been castigated for not realising the severe consequences of non-
compliance with the order, namely, continued loss of life.48
The failure to decree a strong remedy and to supervise its implementation in
the TAC case could, to an extent, as limited as this may be, explain the gaps in
programmes on HIV/AIDS in general and the prevention of mother-to-child
transmission (PMCT)  in particular. As a matter of fact, initial evidence suggested
that the government took the implementation of the order seriously, especially
after being threatened with contempt of court proceedings by the Treatment
Action Campaign. More recent evidence, however, shows that full implementation
of the PMCT programme is yet to be achieved.  Thus: ‘the programs are not
reaching many of the women who need them, apparently in significant part
because women either are not being offered HIV tests or because they are not
agreeing to be tested’.49 It has been explained that women may be refusing to be
tested because of the quality of counselling offered.50    
43Tushnet (n 32), 1911-1912.
44As above, see also ‘Enforcing socio-economic rights: Lessons from South Africa’ (2005) 3 ESR
Review 2.
45Paragraph 129.
46See para 120 of the judgment and Mbazira (n 36) 209. See also Kapcynski and Burger ‘The story
of the TAC case: The potential and limits of socio-economic rights litigation in South Africa’ in
Hurwitz and Satterthwaite (eds) Human rights advocacy stories (2008) 20.
47Mbazira (n 37).
48Budlender ‘Justiciability of socio-economic rights: Some South African experiences’ in Ghai and
Cottrell (eds) Economic, social and cultural rights (2004) 358.
49Kapcynski and Burger (n 46) 24.
50Ibid.
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3.1 The democracy deficit and recalcitrance  
One of the factors that negatively impacted on the effective implementation of
court orders during the pre-Olivia era was the lack of transparency on the part of
government with regard to the measures it had adopted to give effect to the
directions of the court. It is important to note that in many cases this problem
begins long before litigation takes place, and could be a major contributing factor
to the dispute that culminates in litigation. Indeed, discussions on the absence of
community participation in service delivery decision-making processes are gaining
ground. From the perspective of community development academics and
practitioners, reference is made to the concept of participatory development,
which is said to have gained prominence since the 1980s.51 This concept was
promoted as part of the neo-liberal agenda, which ‘envisaged a diminution of the
state and strengthening of the role of civil society [and] seen as a means to
empower ordinary citizens, and the poor in particular, and to promote more
sustainable forms of development’.52 To achieve this, it is envisioned, requires
vigorous participation. Participation is the involvement of local populations in the
creation, content and conduct of a programme or policy designed to change their
lives: ‘Participation requires recognition and use of local capacities and avoids
imposition of priorities from the outside’.53 
In South Africa, participation has been looked at as a tool to respond to the
democracy deficit by creating what has been described as new democratic
spaces. The new spaces ‘are opportunities created for civil society stakeholders
to engage in the policy-making process in ways that seek to overcome obstacles
to participation by marginalised groups’.54 The democratic deficit in meaningful
participation is caused by the failure to link citizens with the institutions and
processes of the state, and impacts on the quality and vibrancy of the democracy
and results in reduced accountability.55 This deficit could explain the wave of
public service delivery protests that have rocked the country since 2004. The
demonstrations became so widespread that some people believed they had the
potential to turn into a revolution with destabilising effects.56 Similarly, it was
51Tapscott and Thompson ‘Participatory development in South Africa: Between rhetoric and practice’
a paper presented to the 14th International Research Society for Public Management Conference,
Berne Switzerland, 6-8 April 2010 at 1.
52Id 1-2. 
53Jennings Participatory development as new paradigm: The transition of development
professionalism a paper prepared for the ‘Community Based Reintegration and Rehabilitation in
Post-Conflict Settings’ Conference, Washington DC October 2000, as quoted by Tapsoctt and
Thompson 2
54Bucus and Hicks ‘Crafting new democratic spaces: Participatory policy making in KwaZulu-Natal,
South Africa’ in Pretorius (ed) African politics: Beyond the third wave of democratisation (2008) 150. 
55Id 152.
56See Hough ‘Violent protest at local government level in South Africa: Revolutionary potential?’
(2008) 36 Scientia Militaria: SA Journal of Military Studies 1-13. 
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thought that the protests had the potential of culminating in acts of terrorism.57 
According to the Institute for Democracy in Africa (IDASA), the protestors
have explained that they took to the streets because there was no way for them
to get to speak to government, let alone to get government to listen to them.58
Indeed, it is reported that the Parliament Portfolio Committee on Co-operative
Governance and Traditional Affairs in a 2009 survey discovered the problems of
service delivery to include: breakdown of local democracy; poor communication
and relationships of accountability with communities; weak community
participation; and community alienation caused by not giving enough attention to
‘bottom up’ planning and consultative processes.59
The democracy deficit described above was also reflected in the
implementation of court orders arising from socio-economic rights litigation. As a
matter of fact, the implementation of court orders arising from socio-economic
rights cases is a complex affair. Thus, although the order in the TAC case
appears uncomplicated and could be summed up as simply requiring the state to
begin providing nevirapine at public facilities, when internalised, the order required
the government to do many things. The government had to go back to the drawing
board and craft a plan for the rolling out of nevirapine and the accompanying
counselling services to all public hospitals.  In such a situation, it becomes
inevitable that the government consults and works with a number of stakeholders,
including the petitioners, to craft strategies for the effective implementation of the
court order. Unfortunately, this was not so in the TAC case. Likewise, absence of
transparency and information on the relocation process explains the inordinate
delay experienced in the implementation of the order arising from the Modderklip
case.60 Evidence suggests that the state withheld vital information on the process
and modalities of the relocation, including the timing of the relocation and the
location of the alternative land.61
Indeed, during the period referred to above, the courts decided a number of
cases revolving around the issue of whether or not the authorities had consulted
with the affected communities and other stakeholders before making certain
decisions. In the case of Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National
57Id 8.
58IDASA The State of local government and service delivery in South Africa: Issues, challenges and
solutions submission made at public hearings of the Parliament Portfolio Committee on Co-operative
Governance and Traditional Affairs 2010-01-22. 
59Chenwi and Tissington Engaging meaningfully with government on socio-economic rights: A focus
on the right to housing (March 2010) Socio-Economic Rights Project, Community Law Centre,
University of the Western Cape 7.
60President of the Republic of South Africa v Modderklip Boedery (Pty) Ltd 2005 8  BCLR 786 (CC). 
61Mbazira You are the ‘weakest link’ in realising socio-economic rights: Goodbye. Strategies for
effective implementation of court orders in South Africa (2008) Socio-Economic Rights Project,
Community Law Centre, Research Series 3 at 25.
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Assembly,62 for instance, the question concerned the nature and the scope of the
constitutional obligation of a legislative organ of the state to facilitate public
involvement in its legislative processes. The applicant’s complaint was that during
the legislative process leading to the enactment of certain statutes, the National
Council of Provinces and the provincial legislature did not comply with their
constitutional obligations to facilitate public involvement in their legislative
processes.63 Justice Ngcobo held that the right to political participation is a
fundamental human right, which is set out in a number of international and
regional human rights instruments and consists of at least two elements: a
general right to take part in the conduct of public affairs and a more specific right
to vote and/or to be elected.64 His Lordship added that the right imposes an
obligation on states to take positive steps to ensure that their citizens have an
opportunity to exercise their right to political participation.65 The Court associated
this right to the constitutional values and the principle of participatory
democracy.66 According to the Court:
The general right to participate in the conduct of public affairs includes engaging
in public debate and dialogue with elected representatives at public hearings. But
that is not all; it includes the duty to facilitate public participation in the conduct of
public affairs by ensuring that citizens have the necessary information and
effective opportunity to exercise the right to political participation.67
In Matatiele Municipality v President of the Republic of South Africa68 the
applicants contested constitutional amendments and municipal laws that had the
effect of redefining provincial boundaries on the ground that concerned communities
had not been involved in the process. Based on the decision in Doctors for Life, the
Court held that the Constitution calls for open and transparent government and
requires legislative organs to facilitate public participation in the making of laws by
all legislative organs of the State. The Court held that failure to ensure public
involvement made the amendments unconstitutional and therefore invalid
The Matatiele case should be contrasted with Merafong Demarcation Forum 
v President of the Republic of South Africa.69 While in the Matatiele case there
was no evidence of public hearings, in the Merafongo case, public hearings had
been held but the petitioners argued that the hearings were meaningless because
the final outcome was a ‘done deal’.70 The Court held that public involvement






682007 1 BCLR 47 (CC) (2006-08-18).
692008 5 SA 171 (CC); 2008 10 BCLR 968 (CC).
70See case at para 43.
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cannot be meaningful in the absence of a willingness to consider all views
expressed by the public.
The pre-Olivia era was also characterised by failure on the part of
government to implement court orders, in some cases characterised by an open
and blatant disregard. The dumbfounding reaction of the Mayor of Johannesburg,
Amos Masondo, to the judgment of the High Court in Mazibuko v City of
Johannesburg71 became an epitome of the widespread problem. When the
decision went against the City, the Mayor publicly attacked the judges as trying
to be above the law and to take over the roles of other organs. The Mayor advised
that if judges want to run the country they should join political parties and stand
for presidency.72  
The Eastern Cape Province for its part became the ‘epicentre of resistance’
to court orders. Relevant court orders in this Province arose out of the
mismanagement and maladministration of the social grant system in the Province.
Many qualified persons had missed out on social grants because of a defective
system of processing new applications, or because their names had been deleted
from lists of beneficiaries without due process of law. As a result, hundreds of
court orders were made against the MEC, Department of Social Development; in
many cases the Department was required to process the applications, reinstate
the payment of those wrongly deleted and in some cases make back pay to the
date when the application would have reasonably been accepted or to the date
when deletion was made.73 In many of the cases the orders were disobeyed, and
the payments were not made as directed. 
4 Olivia and post-Olivia era
4.1 The Olivia case 
The approach of the Court in the Olivia case should be understood against the
context illustrated above. Like the cases described above, the Olivia case arose
amidst social service protests and the rise of state recalcitrance when faced with
court orders.  I have discussed this case in detail elsewhere.74 The case was
instituted by over 300 residents of two derelict buildings from which the City of
Johannesburg was scheduled to evict them. The City was acting in pursuit of a
Regeneration Programme intended to revamp the City by, among other things,
rehabilitating all dilapidated buildings. The Petitioners began their legal fight in the
712010 3 BCLR 239 (CC). 
72See Mbazira (n 60) 31.
73See Vumazonke v MEC Department of Social Development, Eastern Cape 2005 6 SA 299 (SE);
Bushula v Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape Provincial Government 2000 
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High Court, where they argued that they could not be evicted without being
provided with alternative accommodation.75 In agreement, the Court found that the
City’s programme fell short of the requirement to provide suitable relief for people
in the City who were in a crisis or in desperate need of housing. As a remedial
measure, the Court interdicted the eviction and ordered the City to devise and
implement, within its available resources, a comprehensive and coordinated
programme to realise the right to adequate housing progressively for those in
desperate need of accommodation.
The City was not satisfied with the above ruling and appealed to the Supreme
Court of Appeal (SCA). The SCA, in agreement with the City, found the buildings
unsafe and authorised the eviction of the occupiers.76 The Court gave the
occupiers one month to move out or risk being evicted. However, somewhat in
agreement with the High Court, the Court ordered the City to provide alternative
temporary shelter to those in desperate need of housing. The occupiers appealed
to the Constitutional Court against the SCA’s decision.  
During the course of the hearing in the Constitutional Court, the Court ordered
the parties ‘to engage with each other meaningfully ... in an effort to resolve the
differences and difficulties aired in this application’. They were also ordered to file
affidavits on a stipulated date to report on the results of the engagement between
them.77 By this, the remedy of ‘meaningful engagement’ was born.78 Besides being
used as a remedy, the Court has in subsequent cases used meaningful
engagement as a litmus test to determine whether state conduct, especially in
eviction cases, is reasonable. The approach is likely to be extended to other areas
of law in the same way as it has developed from the legislative processes in the
cases described above. In my opinion, this approach was part of a cumulative
process that began with the Doctors for Life, Matatiele and Merfong cases in
response to the democracy deficit described. The response was only now being
extended to socio-economic rights litigation. Indeed, the Court justified the order
based on the fact that, as a public institution, the City had an obligation to engage
vulnerable people before making decisions that adversely affected them.79
Initially, all parties thought that the directive of engagement was meant by the
Court to be interim relief, intended to protect the applicants as the Court prepared
to rule on the bigger questions: whether the City had a plan that was consistent
with the section 26 and Grootboom requirements.80  Thus, the interim remedy was
75See City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd 2007 1 SA 78 (W); 2006 6 BCLR 728 (W).
76See City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd 2007 6 SA 417 (SCA); 2007 6 BCLR 643 (SCA).
77Paragraph 5.
78See Royston  and Tissington Workshop report: Meaningful engagement report of a workshop
hosted by the Centre for Applied Legal Studies (CALS) 2009-07-27.
79Paragraph 16.
80Ray Engagement’s possibilities and limits as a socioeconomic rights remedy, available at
http://works.bepress.com/cg/viewcontent.cg?article=1002gcontext=brian_ray  3 (accessed2010-11-20).
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viewed as an ‘interim structural interdict’.81 However, although the Court avoided
the bigger question, the interim remedy was very successful. After a few months,
the parties reached a settlement. The City agreed to stop evictions and instead
to make the buildings safer and more habitable. The City undertook to clean the
buildings, provide sanitation services, make water accessible and ensure that the
toilets were functional. Later, over 400 residents were moved to better permanent
housing with running water, electricity and other sanitation facilities. All this was
achieved without Court intervention. The significance of this lies in the fact that the
implementation of the court orders could be achieved with minimal court
intervention if they arose from negotiated settlements.82 
Instead of dealing with the bigger question, the Court in its final judgment
emphasised the importance of engagement. According to the Court, the state has
a constitutional obligation to encourage the involvement of communities and
community organisations in local government.83 The Court also emphasised that
engagement in this regard was not to be ad hoc but has to be built in all the
processes of a programme.84 To achieve this, local authorities required a cadre
of sensitive workers skilled in engagement.85 According to the Court, it was
necessary for the authorities to maintain the records of the engagement process
to enable the Court, if necessary, to review not only the results of the engagement
but the process as well.86
4.2 Post-Olivia cases 
The success scored by the Court in using engagement in the Olivia case
motivated the Court to push ahead with this approach and apply it in subsequent
cases. Indeed, subsequent litigation shows that meaningful engagement has been
received by litigants not only as a remedial measure, but more so as an
independent ground upon which one can challenge government conduct, policy
and legislation as unconstitutional. In socio-economic rights litigation, this raises
questions about the relationship between ‘meaningful engagement’ and the
‘reasonableness programme’ approach as coined in the Grootboom case.  In my
opinion, although one can argue that meaningful engagement is one of the
elements of a reasonable programme, it has come in handy as a supplementary
approach to reasonableness. It appears to stand out distinctively and can be used
without necessarily amalgamating it in the reasonableness review. In using
meaningful engagement, the decision of a court does not revolve around whether
81Mbazira (n 60) 19.
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the decision of the state is reasonable or even rational within the parameters of
the reasonableness review. The question is rather whether the available evidence
suggests that the community was reasonably engaged; forget that the ultimate
decision reflects their desires.  
In aggregate, the power of meaningful engagement when compared to
reasonableness is threefold: first, rather than wait for a reasonable programme,
which in most cases is devoid of providing individual goods and services,
engagement can be used as an interim measure to ensure that the applicants get
access to some material goods and services. Secondly, meaningful engagement can
be used to come to the aid of poor people even in circumstances where they cannot
prove that their rights have been violated. Lastly, meaningful engagement appears
formidable only if used against the state in circumstances where the state is willing
to follow through with the process in good faith. At the same time, the applicants as
well must be prepared to make some concessions, where this is reasonable. 
The first case to which the approach was extended after Olivia is Mamba v
Minister of Social Development.87 This case arose from unfortunate events that
occurred in May 2008, involving violent attacks on Zimbabwe and other African
migrants. As a response to the massive displacement of several migrants,
provincial administrations set up temporal camps to provide relief and security to
the migrants. Government intended these camps to be temporary and moved to
close them as soon as calm returned. Several CSOs working on issues of
migrants and refugees opposed the proposed closures, arguing that what was
required was to find solutions to the underlying factors that had resulted in the
violence. The authorities did not listen. Some provinces, including Guateng,
publicly set dates for the closure of the camps. To contest these moves, several
organisations, led by the Consortium for Refugees and Migrants in South Africa
(CoRMSA), petitioned but lost in the High Court.88 The Petitioners then applied for
direct access to the Constitutional Court, which was granted on 18 August 2008.
On this day, the Court granted the Petitioners an interim order interdicting the
closure of the camps. Almost in the same terms as Olivia, the Court directed the
parties to ‘engage with each other meaningfully and with all other stakeholders …
in order to resolve the differences and difficulties aired in the application’.89  The
parties were directed to report to the Court with the results of the engagement.
Unfortunately, the engagement directive in this case did not yield the same
results as had been the case in the Olivia case. The Gauteng province interpreted
the directive narrowly as requiring merely that it keeps the petitioners and
stakeholders appraised of developments towards closure of the camps.90 In spite
87CCT 65/08 (2008).
88See Mamba v Minister of Social Development Case no 36573/08 [2008] ZAGPHC 255 (Pretoria
High Court).
89Order at para 1.
90Ray (n 80) 9-10. 
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of a second order reinforcing the first directive, the Gauteng government persisted
in its narrow understanding of the order and closed the camps. CoRMSA withdraw
the case as moot.  
The successful use of engagement in the Olivia case and its dismal failure
in the Mamba case illustrates that when it comes to finding appropriate remedies,
there is no ‘one size fits all’. Every case arises from a specific context and
circumstances, and raises its own peculiar issues. This makes it important for the
Court to study the circumstances of each case carefully and avoid a casual
transplant of a remedy from one case to another. Brian Ray has illustrated the
circumstantial and contextual differences between Olivia and Mamba.  Ray sees
the impact of the Olivia context as having arisen from the decisions of the High
Court and the SCA. The High Court had interdicted the eviction and although the
SCA decision allowed the eviction to go ahead, it imposed some restrictions
requiring the City to revise its original plan. According to Ray: 
Once the case reached the Constitutional Court, the City was already well on its
way to instituting a revised policy, and the engagement order gave the residents
and the groups representing them sufficient leverage to force the City to take
seriously their views on the policy.91
In addition to the above, these cases show that the success of engagement is
very much dependent on the good will of the state and its willingness to resolve the
dispute amicably. Among others, the response of the state in this regard depends on
the political issues at stake. In the Olivia case, a careful political reading must have
given the state indications of the political cost of not resolving the dispute. As
illustrated above, the country had been engulfed in violent service delivery protests;
state recalcitrance could have ignited protests of dangerous proportions across the
country. Additionally, the Petitioners in the case were but a fraction of the persons
similarly situated. In the circumstances, the City could not risk fomenting animosity
with the Petitioners and a chain of protests. In the Mamba case, the constituency of
immigrants was not as big as that of the service delivery protestors. They were in too
vulnerable and weakened a state to organise any protests. Any protests organised
by them would have met with resistance from the same xenophobic groups that were
responsible for their dislocated fate in the first place, and it could have descended
into a situation of ‘us’ (South Africans) against ‘them’ (foreigners). Additionally, with
widespread frustrations with regard to service delivery for the citizens, the political
authorities never felt themselves obliged to make provision for this group in a context
where the authorities were still fighting uncontrolled influxes of desperate
Zimbabweans at the borders. In the mind of the political authorities, the costs of
disobeying the court could have been viewed as less than the costs of sending out
a message that South Africa was obliged to provide for economic refugees. This is
an undeniable political reality that existed.  
91Ray (n 80) 11.
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Unlike the Mamba case, the Joe Slovo case presented favourable
circumstances for the use of engagement. Like the Olivia case, the Joe Slovo
case involved the eviction and relocation of hundreds of residents from an
informal settlement which authorities intended to up-grade by building low cost
houses. The residents resisted the relocation mainly on the ground that the
proposed site for relocation was too far from the City of Cape Town where most
of the residents worked. Yet there was no evidence that the applicants would be
given priority once the low cost houses were completed.  
Although the Constitutional Court upheld a High Court order allowing for the
relocation, it staggered the exercise over a period of a couple of months. The
Court was divided on whether the respondents had reasonably and meaningfully
engaged the applicants during the planning and implementation of the low cost
housing project.92 In spite of this, the Court in its final order directed the applicants
and respondents, through their respective representatives, to engage
meaningfully with each other with a view to reaching agreement on some of the
issues. This included the date upon which the relocation would commence and
the timetable for the same.93 In this regard, the Court gave indications on matters
that the parties should discuss in the process of engagement:
(a) the names, details and relevant personal circumstances of those who
were to be affected by each relocation;
(b) the exact time, manner and conditions under which the relocation of
each affected household would be conducted;
(c) the precise temporary residential accommodation units to be allocated
to those persons being relocated, including the need for transport to be
provided to those to be relocated;
(d) the need for transport of the possessions of the residents being
relocated;  and
(e) the prospect in due course of the allocation of permanent housing to
those relocated to temporary residential accommodation units.
Justice Ngcobo viewed engagement as a key requirement of implementation
of a programme. According to the Judge:
Individual engagement shows respect and care for the dignity of the individuals.
It enables the government to understand the needs and concerns of individual
households so that, where possible, it can take steps to meet their concerns.94
In a concise manner, the Judge developed the meaning of engagement as
a remedy, stressing that the process does not require the parties to agree on
every issue; that what is required is good faith and reasonableness on both sides
and the willingness to listen and understand the concerns of the other side.
According to the judge, the goal of meaningful engagement is to find a mutually




acceptable solution to the difficult issues confronting the residents, the
government and the quest to provide adequate housing.95 The Judges also
stressed the fact that the above goal ‘can only be achieved if all sides approach
the process in good faith and with a willingness to listen and, where possible,
accommodate one another’.96
On 7 September 2010, the Constitutional Court made another order of
engagement in School Governing Body of Juma Musjid Primary School v AA
Essay NO.97 This case arose from an order that had been granted by the High
Court for the eviction of a school, namely, the Juma Musjid Primary School. The
Juma Musjid Trust, which established the school over 80 years ago, was
prompted to apply for an eviction order because of the failure of the Department
of Education to pay the usual rentals and maintenance fees to the Trust. The
eviction was resisted on the ground that it threatened the rights of the children
involved to education. The provisional order required for negotiations to be
conducted between the Department of Education, the Trust and the School
Governing Body with a view to finding a solution. The options the Court suggested
included the possibility of entering into a section 14 agreement as envisioned by
the South African Schools Act 84 of 1996, which would regulate the lease of the
premises to the Department. The Court ordered that if continued operation of the
school on the premises in terms of the agreement fails, the MEC for Education
must report on the steps taken to secure alternative placements of the children in
accordance with their right to basic education. 
4.2.1 Joe Slovo – substantive goods and services?  
As mentioned at the beginning of this paper, one of the criticisms that have been
levied against the Grootboom approach is the failure of the remedies to guarantee
successful litigants individual goods and services. Closely related to this is the
Constitutional Court’s rejection of the minimum obligations core approach.98
Academic critiques have in the past demonstrated that this has arisen from the
Court’s failure to give the rights substantive content.99 Bilchitz, one of the
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[T]he right is not just a right to have the government act reasonably when it comes
to socio-economic provision in society. Deference is not owed to the government
in defining the content of the right to have access to adequate housing, but only
in allowing it a ‘margin of appreciation’ to decide which measures it will adopt in
fulfilling its obligations. In giving effect to the right, the measures the government
adopts must be reasonable in relation to the object it seeks to achieve, which is
to realize the right of access to adequate housing. This enquiry requires the
specification of some content to the right, independent of the notion of
reasonableness.100    
As recently as 2009, the Court has been advised to make a conscious effort
to develop the normative content of the various socio-economic rights described
in sections 26(1) and 27(1).101 According to Liebenberg, this task should be
approached by considering the purpose and values which the right seeks to
promote in light of their historical and current socio-economic content.  
The approach in Joe Slovo indicates that the Court is beginning to respond
to the above criticisms and suggestions. The Court, in ordering temporary
residential accommodation, described in detail the form such accommodation
should take. The Court’s prescription can indeed pass as the minimum core
content of alternative accommodation for persons facing eviction. According to the
Court, such temporary residential accommodation units have to: be at least
24m2 in extent; be serviced with tarred roads; be individually numbered for
purposes of identification; have walls constructed with a substance called Nutec;
have a galvanised iron roof; be supplied with electricity through a pre-paid
electricity meter; be situated within reasonable proximity of a communal ablution
facility; there must be reasonable provision (which may be communal) for toilet
facilities with water-borne sewerage; and reasonable provision (which may be
communal) for fresh water.102 This elaboration contrasts sharply with other cases
including Grootboom and Modderklip in which there is no indication regarding the
quality of alternative accommodation. What is left is to see whether the courts are
going to apply the above minimum standards to subsequent cases in which
alternative accommodation is at stake. This is in addition to extending this
approach to cases other than those involving housing.  
5 Conclusion
For a democracy that is only 15 years old, South Africa has made a lot of
progress in abandoning the practice of parliamentary supremacy and in its place
entrenching constitutional review. The world over, the jurisprudence from the
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South African courts, particularly the Constitutional Court, has become a tool for
public interest law scholars and litigators. The most extraordinary in the catalogue
of cases has been those enforcing socio-economic rights. Perceptions regarding
the justiciability of these rights have not been the same since the year 2000 when
the Constitutional Court handed down the Grootboom judgment. The case has
spurred academic research and debates of unimaginable proportions within the
human rights community.   
Outside the academic realm, however, questions have been asked regarding
the potential of litigation to alleviate the plight of the poor. From an academic
standpoint, the question has revolved around the potential of litigation as a tool
for socio-economic transformation and has led to the emergence of the
phenomenon of ‘transformative constitutionalism’. In the foreword to Sandra
Liebenberg’s seminal book, Socio-economic rights: Adjudication under a
transformative constitution, Karl Klare summarises the academic debate (or call
it dilemma) in the following words:
South Africa’s transformative constitutionalism is by now a diffuse mass of
doctrinal experimentation, intellectual creativity, concrete problem-solving,
ambiguity, uncertainty, false starts, and, frankly, more than a few hopes and
prayers.
Klare’s observation is more applicable to the Constitutional Court’s approach
to the subject of finding remedies for socio-economic rights violations than to
other areas of constitutional litigation. The Court has, in the past, tended more to
select ‘weak’ remedies which do not result in substantive goods and services for
the poor. In spite of this, to borrow a phrase from Klare, ‘intellectual creativity’ on
the bench has resulted in such creative and ‘extra-ordinary’ remedies as
meaningful engagement. This has, albeit on a limited scale, not extended to
persons similarly situated to the litigants, or resulted in the enjoyment of
substantive goods and services as the ‘fruits’ of litigation. The Court has infused
the structural interdict into meaningful engagement by requiring parties to report
their negotiations to the Court. This approach has dissipated criticism regarding
the Constitutional Court’s reluctance to use the structural interdict in socio-
economic rights cases.  What now remains to be seen is how far the Court will go,
to borrow a phrase from Klare, with this ‘doctrinal experimentation’.  
